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Katharina Heyden 
 
‘Innovation’ as a heresiological argument and a theological topic in Akindynos' 
Refutatio of Palamas’ Epistula III  
 
1. Innovation: An old problem within Christianity  
Since early times, opponents in disputes involving Christianity have often accused each other 
of spreading new teachings. This applies to inner-Christian polemics as well as to disputes 
between Christians and others. With regard to paganism, the Athenagoras of Athens, in the 
2nd century, was the only Christian apologist who tried to appeal to the novelty of Christianity 
in the history of religion as an argument in favour of Christianity.1 All others emphasized the 
loyalty of Christians to ancient Roman traditions and to “classical” values and convictions. 
Looking at inner-christian controversies, a revealing example is that, in Paul’s letters to 
Timotheus, some copyists changed κενοφωνία (id est vain speech) into καινοφωνία (new 
speech).2 Both terms were apparently seen as synonymous. 
However, the roots of such a pejorative approach to novelty, or innovation, go back even 
farther than Christianity. Already in classical antiquity, the old was considered superior 
(πρεσβύττερον κρεῖττον)3. It is therefore not surprising that the accusation of invalid 
innovation is also found in the controversy between Akindynos and Palamas. Unusual, 
however, is the intensity, both quantitative and qualitative, with which Akindynos approaches 
this topic in his Refutationes against Palamas.  
 
Starting from this observation, the question I would like to address in my paper is the 
following: Does Akindynos merely use the concept of innovation as a rhetorical device to 
combat theological reasoning that he opposes – or does he rather treat innovation itself as a 
theologically loaded problem, and if so: for what reason?  
To answer this I will examine first terms and phrases and then rhetorical and argumentative 
strategies by which Akindynos rejects innovation. As far as I am aware, this is the first attempt 
to study this aspect in Akindynos`s works. Therefore, my objective in this paper is a modest 
one: I limit myself to the Refutatio of Epistula 3, which we have examined in our research 
project, and based on this source I endeavor to create a typology, which could then be 
extended to the entire work of Akindynos. 
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2. Terms  
In the Refutatio, derivates from the Greek root καιν- appear 27 times. Twice Akindynos 
addresses Palamas as "the new theologian” (ὁ καινὸς θεολόγος). First in Refutatio 2, 
Akindynos juxtaposes statements of Palamas on divine energies with references from the 
Cappadocians Basileios and Gregory of Nazianzen on the perfection of God. From this context, 
it is already clear that ὁ καινὸς θεολόγος is in no way a positive or neutral term, but rather 
points to the accusation of apostasy from the doctrine of the fathers. 
In Refutatio 10 Palamas is again called “the new theologian”, this time in a polemical 
exclamation: “And how could I keep this legacy for you, you new theologian (ὦ καινὲ θεολόγε), 
since it is not from the fathers – what nonsense! – but from the father of lies and heresies?” 
Here the accusation is made explicit through word play which traces the teachings of Palamas 
to the “father of heresies” (meaning the devil) instead of the orthodox Church fathers. 
Nouns that Akindynos uses to describe innovation are, on the one hand, καινοφωνία which 
appears four times4 and καινοτομία, or rather the verb καινoτομέω, each of which appears 
only once.  
In my impression Akindynos uses καινὸς θεόλογος and καινοφρωνία / καινοτομία retorts to 
κενόφρονος, by which Palamas tries to brand him in the letter version that Akindynos copied 
and to which the Refutatio refers (Epist. III Nadal 2,8,13). Thus, the play with the words καινός 
(new) and κένος (vain) we find in the text-critical variants of Paul's Letters to Timothy 
continues with Akindynos and Palamas. And I tend to believe that this is not a coincidence. 
 
3. Rhetorical strategies 
More revealing than the simple analysis of terms and their semantics is an investigation of the 
rhetorical and argumentative strategies within which Akindynos utilizes this linguistic 
material. Following the patterns of discourse established in Byzantium in theological disputes, 
he cites a large number of fathers to prove his positions and to fight any innovation:  "Because 
we love them” Akindynos claims in Refutatio 8, “because we love them as a completely intact 
and secure throne of orthodoxy, we will not in any way permit these unholy new utterances 
of yours…”  
The table shows an overview of the persons whom Akindynos claimed to be “an intact and 
secure throne of orthodoxy”  
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Ref.   
2 Basilios, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa  
3 Maximos Homolegetes 
4 Dionys Areopagites; John Damascenus, Gregory of Nyssa 
5 Dionys Areopoagites, Maximos, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius 
«or rather Christus himself, Isaac the Syrian, Paul, Isaiah, Gregory Nazianzen, 
Maximos Homologetes   
6 Basilios, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory Nazianzen, John Chrysostom, Dionys 
Areopagite 
7 Maximos Homologetes, Epiphanos of Salamis, Athanasios of Alexandria, Maximos 
Homoloegetes, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, Isaac the 
Syrian, Athanasios of Alexandria, Basilios, Dionysios, Athanasios of Alexandria   
8 Gregory of Nazianzen, Basilios, Cyril of Alexandrien, Sophronios of Jerusalem 
9 Epiphanios of Salamiis, John Damascene, Dionys Areopagite, Sophronios of 
Jerusalem, Athanasios of Alexandria 
10 Maximos Homologetes, Dionys of Alexandria 
13 Isaac the Syrian 
14 Athanasios of Alexandrien, Epiphanios of Salamis 
 
(Table: patristic referees in the Refutatio). 
If we compare this to the patristic references in Palamas’ Epistula III, it becomes clear that  
Akindynos relies on the fathers to a much greater extent. Furthermore, he stages the 
references to the orthodox fathers very skillfully.  
 
3.1. Staging a debate with the fathers 
The rhetorical finesse lies in the fact that Akindynos does not only refer to the fathers as 
authorities of the past. Rather, he stages a direct dialogue between Palamas and the late 
ancient theologians which is of course anachronistic but aims for a greater impact. This is most 
evident in Refutatio 2 where he interrupts a quotation from Gregor of Nyssa’s Oratio 
Catechetica with the following insertion: 
 
ᾧ φησιν ὁ θεολόγος ἔτι καὶ ὁ θεσπέσιος Γρηγόριος ὁ Νυσσαέων ἐν τῷ κατηχητικῷ πρὸς τοὺς 
Ἕλληνας οὐ μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους ἢ σὲ καὶ τὸν σὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι 
ζῆλον, κοινὴν δὴ ποιούμενος πρὸς Ἕλληνας τὴν διάλεξιν οὕτως ἡμᾶς αὐτὴν ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς 
ἐκείνους καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς νῦν διδάσκει· 
 
This is what the theologian, namely the divine Gregorian of Nyssa, talks about in the 
Catechetical Oration to the Hellenes, now less to those than to you, namely with regard to 
 4 
your zeal against those in your teachings. So he makes the discussion with the Hellenes a 
common one, and so he teaches us now to lead them with those and with you.  
 
According to Akindynos, Gregory of Nyssa and all the other church fathers do not only speak 
to their own, 4th century contemporaries, but they directly address Palamas:  Ἄκουσον τοῦ 
θεσπεσίου Μαξίμου / “Listen to the holy Maximos” he calls upon Palamas, and after having 
cited Maximos, he asks as how to make sure: ἀκούεις; “Do you hear?” (Refutatio 3). At 
another point,  Isaac the Syrian is called upon to bring Palamas to his senses: 
 
“But the divine Isaac, of whom you have the highest opinion because of his theoretical 
considerations - but we, you say, have nothing in common with him because of the lowliness 
of our thinking and the tastelessness of our view directed against you - he shall now educate 
you and bring you rabid man to reason!” (Refutatio 7) 
Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ θεσπέσιος Ἰσαάκ, ᾧ μάλιστα σὺ φρονεῖς διὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν· ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μετεῖναι λέγεις 
αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ χθαμαλὸν ἡμῶν τῆς διανοίας καὶ ἄγευστον τῆς κατά σε θεωρίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος οὖν 
παιδευέτω σε καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶφρον μεμηνότα ἐπαναγέτω. 
 
This `making simultaneous` the discourses of the 4th and 14th centuries goes beyond the 
traditional use of the Church fathers by Byzantine theologians. Akindynos does not only refer 
to the authorities of antiquity, but rather elevates the ancient disputes to typological and 
supertemporal ones. Arguments and decisions thus become applicable to his own time, and 
he can summon them against Palamas. 
It is, however, remarkable that Akindynos explicitly refuses to play the fathers off against each 
other. In Refutatio 6, after having quoted Saint Basil, he asks rhetorically:  
 
"What is the need to counter these statements on an established doctrine of another Holy 
Father, as if it were holy and imperative to strive and do almost anything to refute one 
statement of the Holy Fathers by another, in order to introduce something completely new 
and to overthrow the faith handed down to us from time immemorial and to transform 
everything into our understanding?” 
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Ref. 6: ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τοῦτο ἦν ὅσιον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον σπουδάζειν καὶ πάντα ἐπιεικῶς 
πραγματεύεσθαι, ὁπως δι᾽ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἀνασκευάζωμεν τῶν ἱερῶν πατέρων, ἵνα τι πάντως 
καινοτομήσωμεν καὶ τὴν πάλαι κειμένην ἡμῖν ἀνατρέψωμεν πίστιν καὶ πάντα πρὸς τὴν 
ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν ἅπαξ σφαλεῖσαν μετασκευάσωμεν;  
 
The need to assert absolute unity among the Church Fathers arises from the fact that Palamas 
himself, of course, quotes them to a great extent in order to support his teachings on divine 
energies. In order to overcome Palamas, Akindynos must therefore present the Church 
Fathers as a unified group that appears clear and unambiguous. Otherwise they would not be 
able to resolve the current ongoing conflict. 
But in order to be able to refer to them as a unified group, Akindynos must demonstrate that 
Palamas misquotes the Church Fathers. He does this by accusing Palamas of falsification both 
by addition and by omission. 
 
3.2. The charge of falsification 
a) Falsification by addition  
This applies in particular to the formulation which in Epistula III is declared the main 
controversial issue in the whole document. I am speaking of the addition of φύσει to the 
quotation of Pseudo-Dionys Arepoagita which Akindynos discusses in Refutatio 9. Indeed, in 
the version of Palamas’ Epistula III used by Akindynos, Palamas himself defends this addition: 
«So how could anyone agree, even if no word is lost about the divine energies, that the 
Uncreated is One, without adding 'by nature'?» (Epist. 9). It is not my task here to discuss how 
credible this version of the letter actually is. As you probably know, there is an intensive 
discussion about this, especially with Nadal, who accused Palamas of having revised his own 
letter and rid it of problematic formulations.5 What matters to me here is how emphatically 
Akindynos highlights this addition (in Refutatio 9 and 14). The main point of disagreement is 
whether there can be something that is uncreated not by nature, but by grace, meaning that 
created things can become uncreated. This is what Palamas teaches with regard to human 
beings – namely Melchisedek and Paul but potentially also the hesychast monks – that they, 
although created, became or can become uncreated natures by participation in the divine 
energies. Akindynos accuses Palamas of introducing such thinking and attributing it to 
Dionysios – as well as to Athanasius and Epiphanius in Refutatio 14 – with the addition of 
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φύσει ("by nature"). Because this addition makes it possible to assume that there is, or at least 
can be, another deity that is uncreated "not by nature, but by grace". The consequence would 
be, according to Akindynos, that there are created divine energies through which man can 
participate in the uncreated being of God. And this he denounces as a relapse into Greek 
polytheism and at the same time as a logical impossibility, since something originally created 
cannot be uncreated. Therefore, he repeats "uncreated by nature" (φύσει ἄκτιστος) in a 
penetrating way to illustrate rhetorically the absurdity of this thought.  
It is, as I said, not a question of whether he is reproducing the teachings of Palamas at all 
correctly. But the charge of falsification by addition is an important means in his polemical 
rhetoric. 
  
b) Falsification by ommission 
The second form of falsification is, in contrast, that by omission. Two times Akindynos accuses 
Palamas of doing so. The first instance concerns the letter from Dionysius Areopagita to Gaius. 
Interestingly, Akindynos himself admits that Dionysios by δώρον θεοποιόν uses a new 
expression not yet established in ecclesiastical teaching of that time. But Akindynos calls it “a 
small one" (μίκρα καινοφωνία) and immediately points out that through the following 
explanation this expression is fully reconciled with the traditional Orthodox teaching. Palamas 
therefore is accused of disregarding these explanations: 
 
“but that you, though you know this and act blatantly maliciously, cut up the letter of divine 
Dionysius and silently passed over the test of his small novel expression, is obvious. For what 
purpose? The letter is easily comprehensible to the end and says as follows (... quotation...)  
Why then did you silently ignore the greater part and most of all the conclusion of the letter?” 
 
σὺ δὲ εἰδὼς τοῦτο καὶ κακουργῶν προφανῶς διέκοψας τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ θείου Διονυσίου 
καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τῆς αὐτοῦ μικρᾶς καινοφωνίας παρεσιώπησας δῆλον· … τὰ πλείω καὶ μάλιστα 
τὸ τέλος παρεσιώπησας; (Ref.5). 
 
Even in the second case, Akindynos accuses Palamas of deliberately omitting certain 
statements in Maximos Homologetes/Confessor in order to introduce his new teachings:  
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«And what was said about Melchizedek by the divine Maximos, who, according to the divine 
apostle, had become like the Son of God (...), you did not adopt, because you had been 
longing, it seems, for new expressions!” 
 
Καὶ ὅ, τι που περὶ τοῦ Μελχισεδὲκ τῷ θείῳ Μαξίμῳ παρέφθεκται, ὃς ἦν  φωμοιωμένος τῷ 
υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ (…) τοῦτο οὐ παραλαβών, ἅτε πάλαι κεχηνώς, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰς τὰς καινοφωνίας,  
 
Palamas thus appears as someone who arbitrarily edits the orthodox authorities of the past. 
Again, it is not at issue here that Palamas makes exactly the same accusation against 
Akindynos, and neither of both is right in doing so. My interest is confined to the rhetorical 
strategies that are employed to combat novelty. In this respect, one more observation is 
notable. 
 
3.3. Renewing old heresies 
Akindynos claims on the one hand that Palamas "wants to plant a new doctrine in the middle 
of the church". But on the other hand, in the next breath, he calls exactly this "new doctrine" 
a well-known heresy: 
 
“…after the most godless heresy against the plan of salvation of the Incarnate Word of God, 
our Redeemer, had once been set in motion, it was again renewed and strengthened more 
and more. What was this heresy originally made of? And what kind was it? From time 
immemorial some believed that the human nature of Christ had become uncreated because 
of the union with God as Logos, by whom it was added and united to a hypostasis. It (scil. this 
heresy) met with accusations from our fathers divine from time immemorial and the 
punishments appropriate for godlessness…” 
 
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ποτὲ κινηθείσης κατὰ τῆς ἐνσάρκου τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν 
οἰκονομίας ἀσεβεστάτης αἱρέσεως πάλιν ἀνακλητικὸν καὶ μᾶλλον συστατικόν. Ἣ  ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς  ἀπετέχθη· τίς δὲ ἦν αὕτη; ἄκτιστον τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὸ  νθρώπινον πάλαι τινὲς ᾠήθησαν 
γεγονέναι τῇ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν λόγον ἑνώσει, ᾧ προσελήφθη καὶ ἥνωται εἰς μίαν 
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ὑπόστασιν· ἣ τοῖς πάλαι θείοις ἡμῶν πατράσιν εὐθύνας ἔδωκε καὶ δίκας ἐπ᾽ ἐκείναις ἀσεβείᾳ 
πρεπούσας καὶ τοὔνομα τῶν ταύτην τὴν αἵρεσιν γεγεννηκότων τῷ  ριθμῷ τῶν αἱρέσεων  ἀπ᾽ 
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἀκτιστῖται γὰρ καὶ μονοφυσῖται ἀναπεφώνηται· 
 
What at first seems to be a paradox turns out to be a rhetorical feat: the allegedly new 
doctrine is not new at all, but only a renewed version of a long known heresy. This has two 
implications. First, the teacher of the new doctrine, in our case Palamas, appears uneducated 
because he doesn’t realise that his teachings have been refused by the Church long before. 
Second, it legitimizes the referral to the fathers. For if the teaching were really new, one would 
also have to fight it in a new way and with new arguments. But if one can show that it has 
basically long been known, it is sufficient to use the ancient fathers as counterevidence.  
Hence, the novelty of Palamas’ teaching is revealed to be merely alleged novelty. Thus the 
concept of the “new” is finally robbed of everything positive. The opponent is not even 
innovative (which could still make the new interesting and worthy to deal with). In the 
depiction of Akindynos, however, Palamas only appears to be innovative. If the refutation 
succeeds in unmasking this as false, as Akindynos apparently hopes, the allegedly new 
doctrine loses all attraction. 
 
4. The „new“ as a theological problem 
Coming to the theological aspects, it seems to me important that Akindynos relates the 
invention of a new deity to the conception of the biblical motive of the new creation. 
According to Akindynos, Palamas’ teaching on divine energies leads in its final consequence 
to the invention of a new type of deity:  
 
“the new and subordinate deity, which is participable and effectual, and is not material and 
as such spiritually visible with bodily eyes, which, as you assert, shares the nature and nature 
of the power and energy of God.” (Das Wort "participable" gibt es so im normalen Gebrauch 
nicht, aber du benutzt es vermutlich bewusst.) 
 
Ref. 7: ἢ τὴν καινὴν καὶ ὑφειμένην θεότητα, τὴν μεθεκτὴν καὶ ἐνεργουμένην καὶ ἀνούσιον καὶ 
ὁρατὴν καθ᾽ αὕτην πνευματικῶς σωματικοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τήν, ὡς λέγεις, φυσικὴν καὶ οὐσιώδη 
τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν.6 
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Why does the invention of this deity seem so dangerous to Akindynos that he again and again 
raises it anew to polemicize against it? In my view, this is not only because Akindynos aims to 
present himself as a consequent monotheist. Rather, the reasons are above all soteriological 
- and this takes us to the theological core problem of the Hesychast dispute. 
The fact that Palamas conceives divine energy as created but at the same time as capable of 
making human beings uncreated through participation in God’s οὐσία, has, according to 
Akindynos, consequences for the perception of man’s salvation. This becomes very clear in 
Refutatio 6 and 7, where Akindynos discusses in detail the biblical and patristic notion of man's 
new creation and contrasts it with Palamas’ teachings. The key term Akindynos is defending 
in this respect, is ἀνακαινίζω, re-new, which he contrasts with the notion of a new creation.  
For Akindynos, the new man of whom Paul speaks in his second Letter to the Corinthians, 
chapter 5:17 can only be a renewal of the old and thus remains bound to created nature. All 
verses in the Bible and the Fathers which speak of a new creation, according to him, mean a 
renewal of the old, not a new creation instead of the old.  
This is also relevant with regard to anthropology: Man is not able to overcome his human 
nature. Anything else would result in man being made God - which is the worst error of the 
polytheists. To what extent these considerations also have a social dimension would be worth 
considering. Akindynos, who claims to be a hesychast himself, in any case turns against a 
certain elitism of the monks and denounces it as Pelagianism. With biting mockery, he says 
that Palamas himself probably first and foremost wants to be worshipped as divine. And at 
the end of his Refutatio (14) he warns against a devaluation of all creation through talk of 
uncreated, visible divine energies. With regard to theology, his concern is also to preserve the 
dignity of all created things and of all men equally. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Everyone who aimed to participate in theological debates in 14th century Byzantium had to 
prove his or her agreement with the Church Fathers.7 One could say that loyalty to the 
tradition belongs to the space of discourse8 in which Akindynos and Palamas move together. 
Therefore, Akindynos could accuse not only Palamas of novelty, but also his opponent 
Barlaam.9 In the middle of the Refutatio, Akindynos justifies his adherence to the tried and 
tested with a quotation from the First Letter to John (2:25): “if what you have heard from the 
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beginning remains in you, then you remain in the Son and in the Father". This seems to be his 
motto and his agenda. Is Akindynos therefore simply a staunch conservative who, out of 
principle, resists any kind of innovation? It is my impression that Akindynos’ conservatism has 
deeper roots and reasons. 
In his Refutatio, novelty or innovation appear to be a problem for ecclesiological, theological 
and anthropological-soteriological reasons. He considers any type of innovation or novelty 
dangerous, not only with regard to theological orthodoxy but also for the unity of the church 
and the cohesion within a Christian society. 
With regard to the rhetorical strategies and modes of argumentation, it is exciting to see how 
Akindynos' absolute innovation and renewal of the known and the existing relate to one 
another: in order to prove heresy to Palamas, he relies on the argumentative pattern that the 
allegedly new doctrine is an already well-known and overcome heresy. And in interpreting the 
new creation of men, he emphasizes continuity with the old. With allusion to the biblical 
preacher one could say: For Akindynos there is nothing new under the sun - and there should 
be nothing new, either. He proves to be a profoundly conservative thinker. 
 
With historical hindsight I consider Palamas indeed to be the more innovative thinker of both. 
Also Palamas linked the piety of the Hesychasts to theological tradition, but in contrast to 
Akindynos he continued to develop patristic and monastic theology. Of course he referred to 
ancient authorities of the Church as well, but in a creative and innovative way. Therefore, in a 
way Akindynos is analytically right when he portrays Palamas as a novel thinker. My 
impression is that it was only in the neo-palamism of the 20th century that Palamas was 
declared a conservative who in no way deviated from the doctrine of the fathers. From the 
standpoint that Orthodoxy shows itself exclusively in total agreement with the Church 
Fathers, the innovative aspects of his thinking could not be emphasized. In this way, the power 
of  Palamitic theology was not entirely recognized. One wanted and had to misjudge it because 
innovation as such has been rated negatively in the Orthodox world - and is still today. In this 
respect, the Western theological tradition, which had cultivated a more positive 
understanding of progress and innovation since the Enlightenment, could have found an 
appreciation of Palamas’ theology. But the ecumenical condemnations of that time were 
apparently already so entrenched that Western scholars (like Nadal) adhered as uncritically to 
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Akindynos as Eastern scholars (like Meyendorff and Chrestou) did with Palamas. And at this 
point, it seems, we still stand today. 
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